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ABSTRACT: This article attempts to bridge the multi-disciplinary debate on 
environmental justice and the traditional international legal debate on equity with a 
view to analysing the legal concept of fair and equitable benefit-sharing in 
international law. To that end, the article uses the Nagoya Protocol to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity as a testing ground for: i) unpacking different notions of 
justice that may be pursued through fair and equitable benefit-sharing from access to 
genetic resources and the use of associated traditional knowledge, and ii) relating 
different notions of justice to the different functions that equity plays in international 
law. The aim is to test the potential wider application, in other areas of international 
law that refer to benefit-sharing, of linking a pluralist notion of environmental justice 
to different functions of equity. It is argued that this helps systematically unveil 
implicit legal design choices in relation to the pursuit of justice through international 
law-making, and interpret international legal instruments in ways that can contribute 
to negotiate concrete understandings of justice on a case-by-case basis. 
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The Convention on Biological Diversity1 (CBD) has not attracted sufficient scholarly 
attention as a prolific international law-making engine. 2  It has been remarkably 
successful in building consensus3 among the totality of States in the international 
community, with the notable exception of the United States,4 in gradually developing 
international biodiversity law so as to ensure mutual supportiveness among different 
                                                        
* This paper is part of the project “BENELEX: Benefit-sharing for an equitable transition to the green 
economy - the role of law” (www.benelex.ed.ac.uk) which is funded by the European Research 
Council Starting Grant (November 2013-October 2018). The author is extremely grateful to Prof. 
Francesco Francioni, on the board of advisors to the BENELEX project, for his insightful and thought-
provoking comments on equity and benefit-sharing; and to the participants in the "Expert Workshop on 
Equity, Justice and Well-being in Ecosystem Governance" organised by the International Institute for 
Environment and Development on 26-27 March 2015 in London, UK, for the stimulating exchange of 
ideas. 
1 Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993) 1760 
UNTS 79 (hereinafter, CBD or the Convention). 
2 Morgera and Tsioumani, ''Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow: Looking Afresh at the Convention on 
Biological Diversity' YIEL 2011, Vol. 21, p. 3 and ff.  
3 On the law-making power of consensus see  Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law 
Oxford, 2007, p. 260. 
4 Although note anecdotal evidence that the US takes into account the CBD: for instance, the United 
States supported the use of the CBD scientific criteria on ecologically and biologically significant areas 
in the context of the UN General Assembly’s Working Group on Marine Biodiversity in Areas beyond 
National Jurisdiction (see Summary of the Fourth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal 
Working Group to Study Issues Relating to the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological 
Diversity beyond Areas of National Jurisdiction, 31 May - 3 June 2011 25(70) Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin (6 June 2011) at 7). 
  
international environmental agreements,5  and with human rights.6  Innovative law-
making under the CBD can also be understood as the product of an international 
process that is quite open to inputs from non-State actors, notably representatives of 
indigenous peoples and local communities, 7  and that has increasingly formalized 
opportunities to develop international law from the bottom up.8 In 2010 this law-
making activity culminated in the adoption of a new legally binding agreement under 
the Convention, the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-
sharing (ABS).9  
 
In broad approximation, the Nagoya Protocol regulates transnational bioprospecting – 
the search for plants and animals that are found in one State and from which 
commercially valuable compounds are obtained in another State. In doing so, the 
Nagoya Protocol seeks to balance different equity concerns: first, equity between 
those States where most of the world’s biodiversity is found (which are often 
developing countries) and other States (often developed countries) where research and 
commercial development of genetic resources takes place; second, equity within 
States, with regard to indigenous peoples and local communities that hold traditional 
knowledge that can be used to identify potentially useful properties of a genetic 
resource; and third, the realization of potential global benefits in terms of 
developments in the food, medicine, and energy sectors, as well as contributions to 
the conservation of biodiversity and its sustainable use.  
 
Like other normative developments under the CBD, however, the Nagoya Protocol is 
characterised by heavily qualified and convoluted language, which presents real 
challenges for interpreters and implementers. As a result, its relevance for addressing 
the above-mentioned equity concerns is difficult to assess. To that end, it is proposed 
here to analyse the Nagoya Protocol, and in particular the legal concept of fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing 10  that it enshrines, by drawing on the multi-disciplinary 
debate on justice and linking it with the traditional debate on equity in international 
law.  
 
                                                        
5 Morgera, “Ambition, Complexity and Legitimacy of Pursuing Mutual Supportiveness through the 
EU's External Environmental Action” in Van Vooren, Blockmans and Wouters (eds), The EU’s Role in 
Global Governance: The Legal Dimension, Oxford, 2013, p. 194 and ff.. See also Montini, 'The Rise of 
“Internal Environmental Conflicts” in the Green Economy Scenario' in this volume. 
6 Albeit usually without having recourse to human rights-based language: Morgera, “Against All Odds: 
The Contribution of the Convention on Biological Diversity to International Human Rights Law” in 
Alland et al (eds), Unity and Diversity of International Law. Essays in Honour of Professor Pierre-
Marie Dupuy, Boston, 2014, p. 983 and ff. 
7 This is particularly the case of the CBD Working Group on Article 8(j): see “Report of the seventh 
meeting” (2012) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/11/7, paragraph 20. 
8 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits 
Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Nagoya, Nagoya, 29 October 
2010, in force 12 October 2014) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/1 (2010), hereinafter Nagoya 
Protocol, Article 20. 
9 Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck, Unraveling The Nagoya Protocol: A Commentary of the Protocol on 
Access and Benefit-Sharing to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Boston, 2014; and Morgera, 
Buck and Tsioumani (eds), The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing in Perspective: 
Implications for International Law and National Implementation, Boston, 2013. 
10 Morgera, "Conceptualizing Benefit-Sharing as the Pursuit of Equity in Addressing Global 
Environmental Challenges", BENELEX Working Paper 1, SSRN, 2014. 
  
The connection between equity and justice is an ever-present and never-settled 
question for lawyers, or as elegantly put by Rossi, 
 
Equity has forever been associated with the pursuit of justice and this connection signals that 
it is one of the great features of human identity. But like the definition of justice itself, 
equity's full meaning remains sublimely elusive’11 
 
And yet there seems to be little systematic discussion linking the legal debate on the 
role of equity in international law and the growing, multi-disciplinary scholarship on 
global justice.12 What is attempted in this paper is a pragmatic approach to bridging 
these two streams of scholarship with a view to testing its usefulness as a lens to 
analyse the evolution of the legal concept of benefit-sharing in international law. In 
particular, the Nagoya Protocol will serve as a testing ground to prove two inter-
related arguments. First, the need to engage with other disciplines in understanding 
whether and to what extent multiple notions of justice may be pursued simultaneously 
in international environmental law (section 2 below). Second, the usefulness of 
relating different notions of justice to the different functions that equity is 
traditionally seen to play in international law (section 3 below). The aim is to 
demonstrate the potential wider application of this approach to other areas of 
international law where the legal concept of fair and equitable benefit-sharing is used 
(section 4 below), from a two-fold perspective. First, this approach may help unveil 
systematically implicit legal design choices in relation to the pursuit of justice through 
international law-making. Second, it may help identify interpretations of international 
legal instruments that can contribute to negotiate concrete understandings of justice 
on a case-by-case basis (through implementation or adjudication). 
 
 
2. Justice under the Nagoya Protocol 
 
Environmental justice is often defined in legal scholarship, in first approximation, as 
the fair distribution of environmental burdens and benefits between States, as well as 
within States,13 taking into account conditions of scarcity and inequality.14 Fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing is therefore one way to frame environmental justice, by 
singling out the advantages (the positive outcomes or implications) of tackling global 
environmental challenges so as to help motivate participation by different 
stakeholders.15 As a frame, benefit-sharing has the potential to facilitate ‘convergence 
upon a shared cooperative agenda...[which depends on] each party’s perception of 
                                                        
11 Rossi, Equity and International Law: A Legal Realist Approach to International Decision-making, 
Ardsley, 1993. 
12 Walker, Intimations of Global Law, Cambridge, 2015, p. 166, cautioned about the ‘gulf between 
global law and global justice and profound difficulties involved in closing the gap.’ Although see 
Ratner, The Thin Justice of International Law: A Moral Reckoning of the Law of Nations, Oxford, 
2015. 
13 Based on the discussion in Nollkaemper, "Sovereignty and Environmental Justice in International 
Law" in Ebbeson and Okowa (eds), Environmental Law and Justice in Context, Cambridge, 2009, p. 
253 and ff., p. 254. 
14 Shelton, "Describing the Elephant: International Justice and Environmental Law" in Ebbeson and 
Okowa, cit. supra note 13, p. 55 and ff., pp. 58-59. 
15 Laurie et al, "Tackling Community Concerns about Commercialisation and Genetic Research: A 
Modest Interdisciplinary Proposal", paper presented at Scientific Advancements in Medicine: Legal and 
Ethical Issues, University of Birmingham, 2005, p. 4. 
  
the benefits it can secure from cooperation.’16 As Nollkaemper has aptly explained, 
frames 'play an essential, though not always recognized, role in the development of 
international law': they 'highlight parts of reality over others... so as to promote 
particular evaluations and policies, and ... have distinct normative and regulatory 
implications.'17  
 
At the same time, however, it has been noted that confusion surrounds how benefit-
sharing itself is understood in terms of diverse forms of justice.18 This may be due to 
the fact that during the negotiations leading to the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol, as 
with many other international treaties, attention was focused on how to deliver justice, 
rather than on explicitly discussing what conception of justice was being pursued in 
the first place.19 Nonetheless, the main argument put forward here is that benefit-
sharing under the Nagoya Protocol conflates different dimensions of justice. Such 
conflation may appear problematic as, while it remains implicit, it does not facilitate a 
systematic analysis of the relative weight that may have been attributed to one rather 
than another conception of justice. But from a philosophical and political perspective, 
a pluralist notion of justice is increasingly seen as desirable: different notions of 
justice, in theory, feed into each other and should be conceived as necessarily 
complementary.20 A brief discussion of the relevant literature on a pluralist notion of 
environmental justice will thus be provided, so as to delineate the different 
dimensions of justice that appear relevant for present purposes (section 2.1). On that 
basis, an interpretation of different provisions of the Nagoya Protocol will be 
proposed in order to unpack the different notions of justice that benefit-sharing may 
pursue simultaneously under the Nagoya Protocol (section 2.2) and those that appear 
to have limited, if any, relevance in that context (section 2.3).  
 
2.1 A pluralist notion of environmental justice 
 
As much still remains to be understood in the relatively recent debate on 
environmental justice from a legal perspective,21 the present contribution will not 
shoulder the ambitious goal of relating the vast multi-disciplinary literature on justice 
to the legal concept of benefit-sharing from a theoretical perspective. The more 
modest, preliminary step taken in that direction in this section is that of arguing that 
the legal concept of fair and equitable benefit-sharing implicitly conflates different 
notions of justice. Unpacking them and gauging relationships and tensions among 
                                                        
16 Sadoff and Grey, "Cooperation on International Rivers: A Continuum for Securing and Sharing 
Benefits" Water International, 2005, Vol. 30, p. 420 and ff., p. 420 (emphases added). 
17 Nollkaemper, "Framing Elephant Extinction" (2014) 3 ESIL blogpost. 
18 McCool, "Distributing the Benefits of Nature’s Bounty: A Social Justice Perspective", paper 
presented at the International Symposium on Managing Benefit-sharing in Changing Social Ecological 
Systems, Windhoek, 5-7 June 2012, p. 3. 
19 Suiseeya, "Negotiating the Nagoya Protocol: Indigenous Demands for Justice" Global 
Environmental Politics, 2014, Vol. 14, p. 102 and ff., p. 104. 
20 Fraser, "Social justice in the age of identity politics: redistribution, recognition, participation", 
Discussion Paper FS I 98-108 (1998); and D Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice: Theories, 
Movements and Nature, Oxford, 2007.  
21 Ebbeson, “Introduction: Dimensions of Justice in Environmental Law” in Ebbeson and Okowa, cit. 
supra note 13, p. 1 and ff., p. 35; also Falk, "The Second Cycle of Ecological Urgency: An 
Environmental Justice Perspective" in Ebbeson and Okowa, cit. supra note 13, p. 39 and ff., p. 42; and 
Michelot (ed), Equité et environnement, Brussels, 2012.  
  
them may help pave the way for a more methodical dialogue about the potential 
contribution of this legal concept to environmental justice.  
 
To that end, the present reflection takes as its starting point the synthesis of the justice 
literature offered by environmental justice scholars who argue in favour of a pluralist 
notion of justice based on the complementarity and inter-connectedness of multiple 
conceptions of justice. 22  In particular, attention will focus on the need to better 
understand the interactions between distributive justice, recognition, procedural 
justice and a composite notion of 'contextual justice'.23  
 
As alluded to in the preliminary definition of environmental justice provided at the 
beginning of this section, distributive justice has taken the lion's share of attention.24 
Distributive justice focuses on the fair allocation of various social goods and bads,25 
its preconditions, principles and qualifications, considering who are the qualifying 
participants in a world of scarce resources characterised by vast inequalities in 
wealth.26 This theoretical effort, however, has been increasingly challenged by the 
notion of justice as recognition. Recognition has called attention to social, cultural, 
symbolic and institutional causes underlying instances of unjust distribution that 
relate to diffuse reality of domination and oppression (patterns of non-recognition and 
disrespect of certain groups, stereotypical public and cultural representations of these 
groups, denial of their rights and denigration of their ways of life).27 Both with regard 
to distribution and recognition, procedural justice is also factored in or implied: due 
process and fair procedures with fair opportunities for all parties involved are largely 
seen as a precondition for social and institutional recognition and fair distribution.28 In 
effect, justice theorists across the board ultimately emphasize the crucial role of 
participation for evaluating trade-offs between different concepts of justice and other 
principles in a specific context, in the absence of universal ethical grounds. 29  
Furthermore, the notion of "contextual" justice has been proposed in the ecosystem 
services literature30 to capture a combination of pre-existing social, economic and 
political conditions that influence an actor's ability to enjoy all other (substantive and 
                                                        
22 Eg, Schlosberg, cit. supra note 20; McDermott, Mahanty and Schreckenber, "Examining Equity: A 
Multidimensional Framework for Assessing Equity in Payments for Ecosystem Services" 
Environmental Science and Policy, 2013, Vol. 33, p. 416 and ff.; and Pascual et al, "Social Equity 
Matters in Payments for Ecosystem Services", Bioscience 2014, Vol. 64, p. 1027 and ff. 
23 McDermott, Mahanty and Schreckenber, cit. supra note 22, p. 419. 
24 Which has also been the case in relation to the Convention on Biological Diversity: Vermeylen and 
Walker, "Environmental Justice, Values and Biological Diversity: The San and Hoodia Benefit-sharing 
Agreement" in JoAnn Carmin; Julian Agyeman (eds), Environmental inequalities beyond borders: 
local perspectives on global injustices, Cambridge (Mass.), 2011. p. 105 and ff., pp. 107-108. 
25 This refers to the debate ignited by Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Oxford, 1971. See discussion in 
Schlosberg, cit. supra note 20, pp. 11-29. 
26 Schroeder and Pogge, “Justice and the Convention on Biological Diversity”, Ethics and 
International Affairs 2009, p. 267, pp. 274-275. 
27 This refers to the debate spurred by Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, Princeton, 1990; 
Fraser, Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the 'Postsocialist' Condition, Abingdon, 1997; and 
Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, Boston, 1995. See 
discussion in Schlosberg, cit. supra note 20, pp. 13-20. 
28 Ebbson, cit. supra note 21, p. 12. For a discussion of how participatory justice emerges in other 
theories of justice, see Schlosberg, cit. supra note 20, pp. 25-29. 
29 As synthesized in McDermott, Mahanty and Schreckenber, cit. supra note 22, pp. 419 and 424; see 
also discussion of reflexivity and engagement in Schlosberg, cit. supra note 20, pp. 187-212. 
30 McDermott, Mahanty and Schreckenber, cit. supra note 22, p. 320. 
  
procedural) dimensions of justice. This notion arguably encompasses two sets of 
issues. On the one hand, it points to embedded power asymmetries, possibly also of a 
historical nature, that may not be captured by the dimension of justice as recognition. 
In this cases, it may be argued that corrective justice may be relevant, as the 
restoration of equality among parties by recognising that one party has suffered an 
injustice from the other and by establishing a direct correlation between the 
recognised injustice and its remedy.31 In addition, contextual justice draws on theories 
of capabilities, that see justice as the distribution of opportunities for individuals and 
groups to freely pursue their chosen way of life and wellbeing.32  The notion of 
contextual justice has, furthermore, the merit of emphasizing the mutual influences 
between all the above notions of justice it underpins.33 
 
This general overview should be then related to the growing literature on benefit-
sharing, in particular under the Nagoya Protocol, and justice. 34  In that content, 
recourse is made to another notion of justice - commutative justice as an arrangement 
that is mutually beneficial to the specific parties involved in a situation of exchange. 35  
Also from that viewpoint, the need to reflect on the inter-connections among this and 
other dimensions of justice has been underlined with the aim of starting a debate on 
the relations between justice, equity and international law on benefit-sharing.36  
 
The underlying contribution of this body of literature lies in identifying the limitations 
of the law in pursuing multiple dimensions of justice by genuinely factoring in the 
immense complexities of developing universal norms that are cognizant and apt to 
deal with local power dynamics and different cultural perspectives that make the 
pursuit of justice in context essentially a social process.37 In this connection, however, 
when reference is made to the role of equity from a legal perspective, attention is paid 
to the municipal notion of equity in Anglo-American law,38 whereas "in the context of 
international law, it is essential to rid one's mind of [such] specialized meaning."39 
                                                        
31 Weinrib, "Corrective Justice in a Nutshell" University of Toronto Law Journal 2002, Vol. 52, p. 349 
and ff. 
32 This refers to the debate around Nussbaum and Sen, The Quality of Life, Oxford, 1993; see 
discussion in Schlosberg, cit. supra note 20, pp. 29-34.  
33 See McDermott, Mahanty and Schreckenber, cit. supra note 22, p. 419; and image in Pascual et al, 
cit. supra note 22, p. 1028. 
34 See, for instance, the special issue of Law, Environment and Development Journal, 2013, Vol. 9, 
titled "Fairness in Biodiversity Politics and the Law: Interrogating the Nagoya Protocol" available at 
http://www.lead-journal.org/2013-2.htm  
35 Schroeder, "Benefit-sharing: It’s Time for a Definition", Journal of Medical Ethics 2007, Vol. 33, p. 
205 and ff., p. 207; McCool, cit. supra note 18, p. 9; Vermeylen and Walker, cit. supra note 24, pp. 
108-109 and 122; and Schroeder and Pogge, cit. supra note 26; and Stoll in: “Access to Genetic 
Resources and Benefit-Sharing: Underlying Concepts and the Idea of Justice,” in E Kamau and G 
Winter (eds), Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and the Law: Solutions for Access and 
Benefit Sharing, London, 2009, p. 3; and “ABS, Justice, Pools and the Nagoya Protocol,” in E Kamau 
and G Winter (eds), Common Pools of Genetic Resources Equity and Innovation in International 
Biodiversity Law (Abingdon, 2013), 305. 
36 McCool, cit. supra note 18, p. 9; Schroeder and Pogge, cit. supra note 26; Kleba, "Fair Biodiversity 
Politics with and beyond Rawls", Law Environment and Development Journal 2013, Vol. 9, p. 223 and 
ff. 
37 Vermeylen and Walker, cit. supra note 24, pp. 109 and 122 
38 McDermott, Mahanty and Schreckenber, cit. supra note 22, pp. 417-418; and Kleba, cit. supra note 
36, p. 224.  
39 Thirlway, The Sources of International Law, Oxford, 2014, p. 104 and note 53. 
  
Instead, it is necessary to connect the debate on justice with the specific notion of 
equity in international law with a view to complementing the identification of 
weaknesses in international law with a full understanding of its potential. As a step in 
that direction, the "commonly understood vocabulary" that has emerged from the 
brief discussion in this section will be used to unpack different dimensions of justice, 
identify any omissions, and tease out underlying assumptions40 with regards to fair 
and equitable benefit-sharing under the Nagoya Protocol. 
 
 
2.2 Recognition, commutative justice, distributive justice and procedural justice in 
the Nagoya Protocol 
 
A reading of the title of the Nagoya Protocol suffices to deduce that the Nagoya 
Protocol aims at realizing commutative justice: it suggests, to put it crudely, that 
benefits are shared in exchange for access to genetic resources. As it may be intuitive 
that without access to genetic resources there could be no benefits to share, the overall 
construct of the Protocol is intended to regulate relations of exchange, and is premised 
on a bilateral relationship between a user and a provider country (through a notion of 
inter-State benefit-sharing). 41  But the preamble of the Protocol mysteriously 
‘acknowledges the linkage’ between access and benefit-sharing,42 suggesting that the 
relationship between the two may be more complicated than it appears at first. And in 
effect a more holistic reading of the Protocol indicates that more than a bilateral 
exchange is at stake. Other provisions in the Protocol indicate the intention to factor 
the production of global public goods that benefit the whole international community 
into ABS transactions, 43  such as the contribution of benefit-sharing to the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity,44 but also the realization of 
sustainable development broadly conceived, and contributions to food security, public 
health and the fight against climate change. 45  According to a teleological 
interpretation of the Protocol, therefore, the commutative justice pursued through 
benefit-sharing is one that at the same time foresees a bilateral exchange and an 
underlying, global exchange. In that connection, commutative justice serves to reward 
(and thereby recognise), including through technology transfer,46 the contributions of 
provider countries as ecosystem stewards47 and suppliers of unique materials needed 
                                                        
40 That was also the purpose of the framework proposed by McDermott, Mahanty and Schreckenber, 
cit. supra note 22, p. 417. 
41 This is particularly the case of Article 6(3): see Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck, Unraveling, cit. 
supra note 9, pp. 157-169. See the critique from a justice perspective of the bilateral approach of the 
Nagoya Protocol in De Jonge, "Towards a Fair and Equitable ABS Regime: Is Nagoya Leading us in 
the Right Direction?," Law Environment and Development Journal 2013, Vol. 9, p. 243 and ff. 
42 Nagoya Protocol 8th preambular para (unnumbered in the original: see Morgera, Tsioumani and 
Buck, cit. supra note 9, pp. 387-389. 
43 Morgera, “Bilateralism at the Service of Community Interests? Non-judicial Enforcement of Global 
Public Goods in the Context of Global Environmental Law” EJIL, 2012, Vol. 23, p. 743 and ff. 
44 Which is enshrined in the objective of the Protocol (Article 1). 
45 Nagoya Protocol preambular paras. 7 and 14. 
46 Nagoya Protocol Article 23; and Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck, cit. supra note 9, pp. 314-321. 
47 Under the CBD guidelines on the ecosystem approach, benefit-sharing is seen as a way to reward 
ecosystem stewards: see Principles of the Ecosystem Approach (CBD Decision V/6 (2000)), para 9 and 
discussion in Morgera, Conceptualizing Benefit-sharing, cit. supra note 10, pp. 22-25. This is also the 
point made by Schroeder and Pogge, cit. supra note 26, p. 276. 
  
to advance scientific knowledge and environmental protection to the benefit of 
humanity as a whole.48  
 
Commutative justice is also tightly linked to justice as recognition in the intra-State 
dimension of benefit-sharing, enshrined in the Protocol with regards to indigenous 
and local communities. 49  It can be argued that the innovative provisions of the 
Protocol on benefit-sharing with indigenous and local communities serve to recognise 
and reward these communities for their contributions as ecosystem stewards with 
respect to the genetic resources held by them and for sharing their traditional 
knowledge in ways that benefit humanity as a whole in terms of conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity.50 In addition, the Protocol contains other provisions 
embodying recognition, such as the acknowledgement of communities' worldview 
that genetic resources and traditional knowledge are inseparable,51 although they are 
regulated separately under the Protocol. The latter seems to indicate conceptual and 
political difficulties in embodying indigenous and local communities' understanding 
into the operative text of the treaty. Some of the benefits non-exhaustively listed in 
the Nagoya Protocol may further contribute to recognition, such as the joint 
ownership of intellectual property rights 52  and what is laconically termed "social 
recognition."53 Furthermore, the Protocol contains an obligation for Parties to take 
into consideration communities' customary laws, protocols and procedures,54 and a 
qualified prohibition of restricting customary uses and exchanges of genetic resources 
among communities. 55  This provision has been hailed as the first occurrence in 
international environmental law of inter-cultural legal pluralism,56 but has also raised 
concerns about the 'magnitude of challenges for a cosmopolitan and intercultural legal 
order that does justice to the means of knowing of indigenous peoples' on the basis of 
terms agreed in international law that are 'pre-arranged and confined by hegemonic 
forms of scientific knowledge and policy visions.' 57  In this specific regard, then, 
international law cannot simply be "imposed but must be negotiated, tested and 
                                                        
48 This is recognized in particular in Nagoya Protocol Article 8(a). See Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck, 
cit. supra note 9, pp. 179-184.   
49 Nagoya Protocol Articles 5(2), 5(4) and 7. 
50 This understanding derives from tracing back the origin of these provisions in the Protocol to Article 
8(j) of the CBD and the CBD decisions on the ecosystem approach (CBD Decision V/6 (2000) and 
CBD Decision VII/11 (2004)); see discussion in Morgera, Conceptualizing, cit. supra note 10, p. 24. 
51 Nagoya Protocol preambular paragraph 22. 
52 Nagoya Protocol Annex, 1(j) and 2(q). 
53 Nagoya Protocol Annex 2(p). 
54 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(1); see Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck, Unraveling, cit. supra note 9, pp. 
217-227. 
55 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(4); see Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck, Unraveling, cit. supra note 9, pp. 
227-228. 
56 Bavikatte and Robinson, "Towards a People’s History of the Law: Biocultural Jurisprudence and the 
Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing" Law, Environment and Development, 2011, Vol. 7, p. 35 
and ff. 
57 Kleba and Rangnekar, "Introduction," Law Environment and Development Journal 2013, Vol. 9, p. 
98 and ff, p. 103-104 referring to Vermeylen, "The Nagoya Protocol and Customary Law: The Paradox 
of Narratives in the Law", Law Environment and Development Journal 2013, Vol. 9, p. 185 and ff.; 
and Brand and Vadrot, "Epistemic Selectivities and the Valorisation of Nature: The Cases of the 
Nagoya Protocol and the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform for Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Services", Law Environment and Development Journal 2013, Vol. 9, p. 204 and ff. 
  
modulated in response to the realities of differing worldviews, value systems and 
legal visions."58 
 
Fundamentally, however, the question of recognition with regards to indigenous and 
local communities under the Protocol rests, at the very least, on the recognition of 
their rights under international human rights law. 59  The Protocol text is at best 
ambivalent in that respect. Its preamble points to the relevance of the UN Declaration 
of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and to Parties' commitment not to interpret the 
Protocol in ways that can diminish or extinguish their rights.60 And another provision 
requires that the provisions of the Protocol do not affect obligations deriving from 
other international agreements, except where the exercise of those obligations would 
cause a serious damage or threat to biological diversity.61 But the operative provisions 
that are most relevant with regards to human rights are very heavily qualified, in 
particular when questions of ownership of genetic resources are at stake. 62  An 
interpretation of these provisions based on systemic integration between the Protocol 
and relevant, applicable international human rights instruments - which is also called 
for by the Protocol itself63 - could, at least in theory,64 serve to tackle these concerns. 
Systemic integration thus appears an indispensible ingredient for intra-State benefit-
sharing to contribute to justice as recognition, as will be discussed in more detail in 
section 3 below. That said, it cannot be over-emphasized that the contextual 
application of an interpretation based on systematic integration remains fraught with 
difficulties as the generalized version of justice embodied in an international 
instrument encounters diversity of values, experiences and cultures that cannot be 
reduced to stereotyped notions of what communities and traditional knowledge are.65 
 
With regards to distributive justice, it has been argued that benefit-sharing is not only 
about granting access to valued goods, such as the products or profits derived from 
research and development of genetic resources and traditional knowledge,66 but also 
the fulfilment of basic needs. 67  And in this regard the Protocol not only makes 
                                                        
58 Tobin, "Bridging the Nagoya Compliance Gap: The Fundamental Role of Customary Law in the 
Protection of Indigenous Peoples' Resources and Knowledge Rights," Law Environment and 
Development Journal 2013, Vol. 9, p. 144 and ff, p. 162. 
59 Savaresi, “The International Human Rights Law Implications of the Nagoya Protocol,” in Morgera, 
Buck and Tsioumani, 2010 Nagoya Protocol, cit. supra note 9, p. 53 and ff.; Morgera, Tsioumani and 
Buck, Unraveling, cit. supra note 9, pp. 382-384. 
60 Nagoya Protocol preambular paras. 26 and 27. 
61 Nagoya Protocol Article 4(1). 
62 Nagoya Protocol Articles 5(2) and 6(2) references to 'established rights'. See also Grand Council of 
the Crees (Eeyou Istchee) et al., “Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing: Substantive and 
Procedural Injustices relating to Indigenous Peoples’ Human Rights,” Expert Mechanism on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples, 4th session, Geneva (July 2011). 
63 Nagoya Protocol Article 4(3). 
64 Note International Law Commission, "Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law" (2006) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682, paras 277-
282, cautioning against treaty clauses leaving it to a future "law-applier" to ensure mutual 
supportiveness because of a danger of structural bias. 
65 Vermeylen and Walker, cit. supra note 24, p. 107. 
66 This is notably the case of the monetary benefits listed in the Annex to the Nagoya Protocol, under 1 
such as payment of royalties or joint ventures, but also of non-monetary benefits such as the sharing of 
research and development results, and access to scientific information relevant to the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity: Nagoya Protocol Annex, 2(a) and (k). 
67 Schroeder and Pogge, cit. supra note 26, p. 277. 
  
reference to provider countries and communities holding traditional knowledge, but 
also to the fulfilment of basic needs. Some of the non-monetary benefits listed in the 
Protocol could address the basic needs within provider countries and relevant 
communities: contributions to the local economy, food and livelihoods security, and 
research directed towards priority needs, taking into account domestic uses of genetic 
resources in provider countries.68 In addition, the preamble makes reference to the 
potential of ABS transactions to contribute to global needs with regard to scientific 
progress and innovation, poverty reduction, food security and public health, as well as 
the importance of technology transfer and cooperation for adding value to genetic 
resources in developing countries and building their research capacities,69 which are 
potentially benefits of a global nature.70 The operational provisions of the Protocol on 
special considerations are also relevant from a distributive justice perspective. Parties 
are to consider expeditious benefit-sharing towards those in ‘need,’ in particular 
developing countries, in the context of health-related emergencies, and strike a 
balance between the Protocol’s bilateral ABS architecture and the continuation of 
exchanges of genetic resources for food and agriculture, with a view to contributing 
ultimately to food security. 71  Taken together, these are multiple elements of 
distributive justice, which concern both the countries and communities directly 
involved in an ABS deal, and in some cases much broader, if not global, 
constituencies. Admittedly, however, these obligations have been framed so as to 
leave a significant amount of discretion with regards to their implementation. 
 
All these substantive dimensions of justice compressed within the legal concept of 
benefit-sharing ultimately rely for their realization on procedural justice. In that 
regard, it must be noted that the provisions of the Protocol on prior informed consent 
appear significantly concerned with ensuring procedural justice towards those seeking 
access to resources,72 and may be considered "thin" from a justice perspective.73 In 
addition, the language concerning the prior informed consent of indigenous and local 
communities is heavily qualified.74 That said, these provisions are the first, explicit 
treaty language in international law on prior informed consent in relation to traditional 
knowledge and genetic resources held by indigenous and local communities. 75 
Furthermore, the Nagoya Protocol appears to assume that procedural justice in 
determining the specific details of benefit-sharing among the parties to the exchange 
                                                        
68 Nagoya Protocol, Annex 2(l), (o) and (m). 
69 Nagoya Protocol preambular recitals 5, 7 and 14. 
70 For a skeptic reading of this language in the Protocol from a distributive justice perspective, see 
generally Kleba, cit. supra note 36. 
71 Nagoya Protocol Article 8(b-c) and Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck, Unraveling, cit. supra note 9, pp. 
185-191; and Wilke, “A Trace of Distributive Justice in the Nagoya Protocol: Rules for Health 
Emergencies,” contribution to workshop on “Fairness and Bio-Knowledge”, University of Warwick, 
Coventry, 16-17 June 2011. 
72 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(3); and Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck, Unraveling, cit. supra note 9, p. 
157-169. 
73 Kleba and Rangnekar, cit. supra note 57, p. 102. 
74 Nagoya Protocol Article 6(2) and 7; and Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck, Unraveling, cit. supra note 
9, pp. 145-156 and 170-174. 
75 The former UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya, considered 
the recognition of the right to prior informed consent over traditional knowledge as ‘positive aspects’ 
of the adoption of the Protocol: Human Rights Council, “Follow-up report on indigenous peoples,” 
(2012) UN Doc A/HRC/C/21/55, para. 59. 
  
will permeate the establishment of mutually agreed terms (MAT) 76  - private-law 
contracts. The Protocol itself does not provide, however, any criteria in that regard 
either at the stage of the regulation of MAT negotiations in domestic ABS 
frameworks, their establishment or their enforcement through international 
cooperation.77 Much is thus left to contractual freedom, and it remains to be seen if 
and how State Parties to the Protocol will take the opportunity to limit private parties' 
freedom in this regard. The Protocol, though, requires Parties individually and 
collectively (through the Protocol’s governing body) to explore model contractual 
clauses 78  and voluntary instruments, 79  as well as awareness-raising 80  and training 
activities,81 that may provide a bottom-up source of inspiration for fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing contracts. 
 
Even if this potentially participatory process for determining contextually fair 
contractual provisions can be seen as a promising way forward, particularly in light of 
the variety of sectors involved in ABS and situations of indigenous and local 
communities, procedural justice remains a particularly challenging goal when one 
considers the well-documented inequality in bargaining power that characterizes ABS 
transactions. These are due to asymmetries in technological capacities among user 
and provider countries, unequal access to information on scientific and technological 
value and the commercial potential of genetic resources among those seeking and 
those authorised to grant access. 82  And this is in addition to unequal access to 
resources and the knowledge (including legal knowledge and legal assistance) needed 
to negotiate ABS transactions. 83  These factors clearly point to the inter-linkages 




2.3 Missing the contextual justice dimension? 
 
                                                        
76 Nagoya Protocol Article 5(1-2 and 5) and preambular para. 10. 
77 The Nagoya Protocol provisions concerning MAT are invariably of a procedural character: Article 5, 
Article 6(3)(g); Article 15 and Article 18. Some reference to substantive guarantees only transpires in 
the Protocol provision on supporting indigenous and local communities in securing fairness and equity 
when negotiating MAT (Nagoya Protocol Article 12(3)(b) and in more timid way on capacity building 
for developing countries (Nagoya Protocol Article 22(4)(b) and specific reference to equity in 
voluntary terms in Nagoya Protocol Article 22(5)(b)).  
78 Nagoya Protocol Article 19. 
79 Nagoya Protocol Article 20. 
80 Nagoya Protocol Article 21. 
81 Nagoya Protocol Article 22(4)(c) and 22(5)(b). 
82 Stoll, “ABS, Justice, Pools,” cit. supra note 35, p. 309; and Stoll, “Access to Genetic Resources and 
Benefit-Sharing,” cit. supra note 35, p. 12. 
83 Cariño et al, Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
Benefits Arising from Their Utilization: Background and Analysis (The Berne Declaration, Bread for 
the World, Ecoropa, Tebtebba and Third World Network, 2013), accessed 30 November 2013, 
<www.evb.ch/cm_data/Nagoya_Protocol_complete_final.pdf>, 5. On the North-South asymmetries 
and other conflicting objectives behind the ABS provisions of the CBD, see generally De Jonge, “What 
Is Fair and Equitable Benefit-Sharing?” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 2011, Vol. 
24, p. 127 and ff.; and De Jonge and Louwaars, “The Diversity of Principles Underlying the Concept of 
Benefit Sharing,” in Kamau and Winter, Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and the Law, cit. 
supra note 35, p. 38 and ff. 
  
Whether the Nagoya Protocol, and the legal concept of benefit-sharing enshrined in it, 
also comprise a dimension of contextual justice is a question that will be addressed by 
focusing in turn on capabilities, corrective justice and the need to address other 
structural causes of injustice. 
  
With regard to capabilities, the Protocol provisions on capacity building,84 funding85 
and technology transfer 86 appear relevant. In particular, it should be noted that the 
Protocol addresses capacity building in detail, linking it to implementation and 
compliance, the negotiation of MAT, the development and enforcement of domestic 
ABS frameworks, and the development of endogenous research capabilities. 87  In 
addition, the Protocol not only addresses this question at the inter-State level, but also 
specifically calls upon State Parties to facilitate the involvement of indigenous and 
local communities in cooperation on capacity-building 88  and support the self-
identification of their capacity needs and priorities.89 Vested interests, however, may 
emerge in practice when user countries act as providers of financial and technological 
assistance as well as capacity-building.90 User countries providing such assistance 
could create conditions in provider countries that unduly favour the access side of the 
exchange, particularly when provider countries find themselves dependent on external 
support or are offered ready-made solutions that may not fit their particular 
circumstances.91 It remains to be seen in future practice whether the involvement of 
multilateral bodies providing guidance92 or channelling resources93 may be able to 
balance procedural and contextual justice in this regard. 
 
Corrective justice could also have played a role in the Nagoya Protocol, and benefit-
sharing could have served as compensation for a historical asymmetry between 
provider and user countries. Colonialism fostered the collection and appropriation of 
cultural and natural heritage into museums, zoological and botanical gardens and 
other ex situ collections in colonizing countries. 94  Colonization, mandatory 
assimilation, relocation policies, and globalization forces have also resulted in the 
marginalization of indigenous peoples and local communities and the erosion of their 
                                                        
84 Nagoya Protocol Article 22, particularly 22(4)(b) and (5)(b), (i) and (j). See Morgera, Tsioumani and 
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21 and 325–32. 
87 Nagoya Protocol Article 22(4). 
88 Nagoya Protocol Article 22(1).  
89 Nagoya Protocol Article 22(3). 
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and Benefit-Sharing in Decision NP-1/8 (2014), Annex. 
93 The Global Environment Facility: see discussion in Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck, Unraveling, cit. 
supra note 9, pp. 327-329. 
94 Cariño et al, Nagoya Protocol, cit. supra note 83, 2. 
  
cultures, governance and traditional knowledge systems.95 During the negotiations of 
the Nagoya Protocol, the African Group and civil society argued that benefit-sharing 
under the Protocol should also have addressed historical situations, with a view to 
expanding the range of situations in which the benefit-sharing obligations of the 
Protocol would apply, and addressing possible loopholes related to existing ex situ 
collections developed countries’ gene-banks. For these reasons the negotiations on the 
temporal scope of the Protocol were particularly contentious. 96  In the end, most 
commentators agree that the Protocol does not apply to genetic resources acquired 
prior to the entry into force of the Convention.97 But it remains debatable whether 
benefit-sharing obligations arise under the Protocol for new or continuing uses of 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge acquired in the interim period between 
the entry into force of the CBD and that of the Protocol,98 which could provide some 
corrective justice for more recent appropriations of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge. Until that is clarified, by a decision of the Protocol governing body or its 
compliance mechanism for instance, the role of corrective justice under the Protocol 
remains an open question. 
 
Finally, it could be asked whether the Nagoya Protocol also attempts to tackle other 
preconditions determining an uneven playing field in the ABS context, and in this 
case certain systems created in other areas of international law can be seen as 
determinant of unequal power relationships. As has already been noted by Schroeder 
and Pogge with regard to the CBD,99 there is no attempt in the Protocol to trigger a 
reform of the global economic order concerning bio-based research, and in that vein 
benefit-sharing under the Nagoya Protocol is seen as a "very partial remedy."100 The 
most glaring example of this approach can be found in the minimalistic treatment of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) under the Protocol. IPRs to improved germplasm101 
have enabled private IPR holders to enforce their rights in developed countries, 
whereas developing countries’ claims based on the international notion of national 
sovereignty over genetic resources encounter significant barriers in foreign 
jurisdictions where the IPR holders are based. This scenario is further complicated 
when (ab)use of the IPR system has resulted in the misappropriation of traditional 
knowledge of indigenous and local communities. 102  This asymmetry is likely to 
                                                        
95 For a comprehensive account of the threats and challenges that indigenous peoples face and the 
response of the international community, see UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, State of the 
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worsen in the face of the growth and increasing dominance of multinational 
corporations in the biotech sector.103 Against this contextual situation that is largely 
seen as unjust,104 the Nagoya Protocol avoids almost all reference to IPRs, thus losing 
a ‘golden opportunity’ to provide an authoritative mandate for its Parties to adopt 
national measures that may depart from the relevant law of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and afford protection in the context of a possible WTO law 
dispute.105  
 
While benefit-sharing under the Nagoya Protocol is certainly only a partial response, 
it cannot be excluded that it may still work as a pragmatic, interim solution having the 
potential to gradually erode structural conditions of injustice from the inside. 
Systematically applied in light of the interpretative opportunities identified in this 
section, benefit-sharing could set off virtuous dynamics nurtured by positive, mutual 
interactions between justice of exchange and recognition, as well as distributive and 
procedural justice. At the inter-State level, provider countries could truly benefit from 
ABS transactions in the long term, if they are recognised and rewarded for their 
global contributions to the conservation of genetic resources and gradually build their 
own biotech capacities through their bilateral collaborations with user countries, as 
well as contributing together with user countries to the realization of other global 
goals such as poverty reduction, health protection and food security. And at the intra-
State level, culturally appropriate and endogenously determined106  benefits shared 
with indigenous and local communities that allow access to their genetic resources 
and traditional knowledge according to their values, norms and decision-making 
processes could help better recognize and realize these communities' rights to the 
lands and natural resources they traditionally use and occupy, while improving 
material conditions for their livelihoods and self-determination.  
 
The necessary and appropriate conditions for this vision to materialize remain to be 
fully identified. As are the opportunities and risks with regards to potential and actual 
global benefits that may arise from bilateral exchanges, or the identification (and risks 
of exclusion) of the beneficiaries of specific bilateral exchange.107 To that end, the 
instruments that international law offers are to be better understood. In particular, it 
appears necessary to rely on general international law to fully appreciate the 
opportunities and limitations of the Nagoya Protocol with regard to justice. So the 
second argument put forward here is that the correspondence between different 
                                                        
103 Oberthür and Rosendal, “Conclusions,” in Oberthür and Rosendal (eds), Global Governance of 
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notions of justice and different understandings of the role of equity in international 
law needs clarification. 
 
 
3. Revisiting the legal debate on equity 
 
The questions that emerged from unpacking the different dimensions of justice 
pursued by benefit-sharing under the Nagoya Protocol will now be addressed from a 
more traditional legal perspective. In this context, equity is commonly considered as a 
general principle of international law108 (and therefore applicable even when it is not 
specifically invoked in the text of a certain treaty) that helps to address the 
inflexibilities of law when facing the specificities of individual cases.109 Admittedly, 
the precise meaning and actual impact of equity in international law remains a matter 
of debate, but it seems useful to boil down theoretical questions to a practical 
consideration: equity is recognised as 'part and parcel of legal reasoning,' whose 
logical necessity resides in a 'shared approach to a general need of a strictly legal 
nature.'110 This serves to underline two key characteristics of equity in international 
law. First, it serves to provide 'new perspectives and potentially fresh solutions to 
tricky legal problems' to the benefit of all States, not just to the advantage of - and 
sometimes to the disadvantage of - powerful States.111 Second, equity is found in or 
derived from applicable international law, not outside it:112 in other words, non-legal 
elements of justice (or subjective notions of justice)113 cannot enter explicitly legal 
reasoning.114 For this reason, the above attempt to identify interpretative hooks for 
discussing different notions of justice in a treaty appears indispensible for negotiating 
concrete understandings of justice by relying on international law. 
 
Equity in international law is often understood as a series of equitable principles that 
allow the balancing of competing rights and interests at stake in a specific case,115 
with a view to integrating ideas of justice into a relationship regulated by international 
law.116 The fact that benefit-sharing is now consistently referred as "fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing" in international law117 seems to indicate that it is to be understood as 
such an equitable principle. Although fairness and equity are usually used 
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interchangeably in international environmental law,118 it is suggested that this also 
needs some unpacking. Following Francioni's suggestion, it seems useful to draw 
some considerations from the evolution of the similarly worded notion of "fair and 
equitable treatment" in international investment law,119 which has been subject to 
extensive international adjudication. In particular, it should be highlighted that this 
standard has become a self-standing, powerful tool in balancing the interests of 
private investors and host governments. And, in the connection, it has been fleshed 
out as encapsulating "substantive points of contact" with international human rights 
law in relation to equity, namely non-discrimination, due diligence, procedural 
fairness, and proportionality.120 And as the treaties referring to fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing do not elaborate on what equity and fairness mean in their specific 
contexts, referring back to general concepts of equity and fairness as interpreted by 
international tribunals is a necessary step, 121 particularly when they appear to have 
validity across different areas of international law. 
 
For present purposes, attention is paid to how the interpretation of fair and equitable 
treatment under international investment law links back to the theories of justice 
surveyed at the beginning of this paper. To that end, building upon Klager's insightful 
interpretation122 of Franck's seminal work on equity in international law,123 it can be 
argued that the use of the two expressions "fair and equitable" serves to make explicit 
both procedural dimensions of justice (fairness) that determine the legitimacy of 
certain courses of action, as well as substantive dimensions of justice (equity).124 And 
while, as discussed above, these are inextricably linked notions of justice, from a legal 
perspective they also point to an inherent tension: fairness as procedural justice 
supports stability within the legal system (predictable and clear procedures), whereas 
equity as substantive justice tends towards change (recognition or enhanced 
realization of rights, (re-)allocation of power over resources).125 This tension can only 
be resolved through a “fairness discourse” - a process of negotiation "premised on the 
moderate scarcity of world's resources and existence of a global community sharing 
some basic perceptions of what is unconditionally unfair" and that at the very least 
allows for "meaningful scrutiny of whether or not a certain conduct is ultimately 
fair."126 Within this discourse, two conditions apply for determining what would be 
unconditionally unfair. First, a no-trumping condition, whereby no participant can 
make claims that automatically prevail over the claims made by other participants; 
and this applies also to claims based on national sovereignty. 127  The latter is 
particularly important as it overrides the presumption of freedom of action by 
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States. 128  Second, a maximum condition, whereby inequalities in the substantive 
outcome of the discourse (so, the sharing of benefits) are only justifiable if they 
provide advantages to all participants.129 In the words of Klager, therefore, the use of 
the expression "fair and equitable" is "an invitation by the international law-makers to 
proceed by way of a fairness discourse based on a Socratic method."130  This finding 
resonates with the concept of fair and equitable benefit-sharing emerging from 
international biodiversity law as a concerted and dialogic process aimed at reaching 
consensus in identifying what benefits are at stake and how they can be allocated 
among different State and non-State actors. 131  It also chimes with the different 
theories of justice discussed above, which appear to converge on the need for self-
reflexive and participatory engagement with different concepts of justice and possible 
trade-offs among them.132 
 
Going back to a strictly legal perspective, the fairness discourse in international law 
may either be dispute-specific (adjudication through interpretation of existing rules) 
or normative and general (law-making).133 It therefore links to the emerging general 
principle of mutual supportiveness, which in its interpretative dimension basically 
encapsulates the international customary rule on treaty interpretation of systematic 
integration,134 but also adds a law-making dimension operating across different sub-
systems of international law.135 With regards to the former, as equitable principles are 
open-textured,136 even when they are included in the text of a treaty, treaty language 
alone does not suffice to determine their exact meaning. Rather, when further support 
cannot be found in the terms of the specific legal instrument at stake, reference to 
other sources of international law is necessary to give more specific content to 
equitable principles. In other words, equitable principles are filled with content by 
establishing a linkage with different international legal sub-systems (biodiversity law, 
human rights law, economic law, etc) and as such, play a key role in preserving the 
unity of the international legal order.137 In addition, as international law sub-systems 
are in constant evolution and the inter-linkages among them also contribute to their 
continuous adapting to changed circumstances, equitable principles are also 
evolutionary.138  That said, systemic integration has its limitations, both in terms of 
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the conditions of its application (which needs to be determined on a case-by-case 
basis taking into account a 'substantial legal relationship' between the norm to be 
interpreted and other norms, as well as the extent to which one norm may influence 
the interpretation of another)139 and in terms of outputs (a coherent interpretation of 
different sets of obligations may be virtually impossible in a specific case).140 More 
fundamentally, it is an ex post approach that leaves significant discretion to the 
interpreter.141 The function of equity as a fairness discourse in terms of law-making 
appears therefore to be a necessary, but significantly less explored, avenue. 
 
Against this background, the traditional classification of the functions of equity in 
international law will be interrogated as fairness discourse. Three functions are 
conventionally ascribed to equity.142 First, equity operates infra legem (or within the 
law), when it affects the interpretation of existing rules particularly where these leave 
a margin of discretion to authorities. Second, it operates praeter legem (or beyond the 
law), when it creatively fills gaps in the law. And, third, exceptionally, it operates 
contra legem (or against the law), when it serves to correct or derogate from 
applicable law, 143  and possibly also to modernize law in the light of changed 
circumstances.144 The distinction is easier in theory than in practice, partly because 
legal scholarship on equity remains limited and partly because, for the greatest part, 
the academic debate has conceived of equity from an adjudication perspective.145 
Even within the latter perspective, distinguishing between these functions is not 
straightforward because they 'merge into one another to some extent.' 146 In addition, 
an extensive understanding of legal interpretation could cover all functions of equity, 
downplaying more creative uses of equity for the progressive development of 
international law. Nonetheless, this distinction may be helpful to engage with in order 
to be more alert to the slightest nuance along the continuum between the 
interpretation, integration, correction and making of rules of international law as they 
progressively develop.147 
 
In the case of benefit-sharing under the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol (but also in the 
context of other international agreements 148 ), there is very little international 
adjudication. On the other hand, there is increasing State practice in the form of 
                                                        
139 These challenges are highlighted by Dupuy and Viñuales, cit. supra note 120. 
140 Simma, "Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights?", ICLQ, 2011, Vol. 60, p. 573 
and ff., p. 591. 
141 Ibid. 
142 ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf case, para. 88; ICJ, Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of 
Mali), para. 28. 
143 Eg, Francioni, "Equity" in Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia, cit. supra note 101; and 
Shelton, "Equity" in Bondansky, Brunnee and Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Environmental Law, Oxford, 2007, p. 640 and ff. 
144 Francioni, cit. supra note 143, para. 29. 
145 Burke, cit. supra note 111, p. 253. 
146 Akehurst, cit. supra note 109, pp. 802 and 810. 
147 Francioni, cit. supra note 143, para 21. 
148 The exception is represented by two recent human rights cases: Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, Case of the Saramaka People v Suriname, Judgment of 28 November 2007 ('Saramaka case'); 
and African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Centre for Minority Rights Development 
(Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, 
Comm. no 276/2003 (25 November 2009 - 'Endorois case'); discussed in Morgera, Conceptualizing, 
cit. supra note 10, pp. 25-28. 
  
international (hard or soft) law-making. 149  Benefit-sharing, therefore, provides an 
ideal case study to revisit the traditional discussion on the functions of equity, with a 
view to applying it to international treaty- and soft law-making, against the 
background of the ongoing debate on the fragmentation or unity of international law 
(that is, the debate on whether the proliferation of increasingly specialized 
international regimes could create conflicts between international norms).150  
 
The following sub-sections will interrogate whether benefit-sharing serves to 
operationalize equity within, beyond or even against the law,151 and question these 
functions in light of different notions of justice.152 Different provisions of the Nagoya 
Protocol on benefit-sharing seem to prove that at the very least benefit-sharing can 
operate as equity within and beyond the law (infra and preater legem), and in so 
doing contribute to recognition, distributive and procedural justice, and possibly 
corrective justice. These will be discussed in turn below, and followed by a brief, 
speculative discussion of benefit-sharing as equity against the law (contra legem) and 
its relation to contextual justice. 
 
 
3.1 Benefit-sharing as equity infra legem 
 
With regard to equity within the law, the framing of fair and equitable benefit-sharing 
as the objective of the Protocol153 suggests that the intended function is indeed an 
interpretative one.154 So beyond the specific benefit-sharing obligations that can be 
found in the Protocol,155 benefit-sharing serves to guide Parties in balancing different 
interests at stake with regard to the implementation and application of other open-
ended provisions of the Protocol. This is the case of the obligation to put in place 
national measures on access, on international cooperation on compliance with 
national ABS measures of other State Parties, and on financial and technological 
solidarity, which should arguably be assesses on the basis of whether they identify 
reasonable and appropriate measures to genuinely contribute to realize fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing.156 In that connection, benefit-sharing serves to provide a 
benchmark for applying proportionality: the measures to be adopted at the national 
level need to be suitable and necessary to share benefits fairly and equitably - that is, 
to realize justice of exchange, distributive and procedural justice as discussed above. 
So understood, benefit-sharing as equity infra legem sets material limits to States' 
margin of discretion and provides a yardstick to scrutinize the suitability of domestic 
                                                        
149 See generally Morgera, Conceptualizing, cit. supra note 10; and the mind maps produced by the 
BENELEX project available at http://www.benelex.ed.ac.uk/mind_maps. 
150 International Law Commission, cit. supra note 64; and Dupuy, L'Unité de l'ordre juridique 
international: cours général de droit international public, Leiden, 2003. 
151 The question had already been posted by Francioni, cit. supra note 143, para. 28. 
152 Note in this regard, ILC, cit. supra note 64, para 480: 'By making sure that the outcome is linked to 
the legal environment, and that adjoining rules are considered - perhaps applied, perhaps invalidated, 
perhaps momentarily set aside - any decision also articulates the legal-institutional environment in 
view of substantive preferences, distributionary choices and political objectives.' (emphasis added). 
153 Nagoya Protocol Article 1; and Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck, Unraveling, cit. supra note 9, pp. 
48-58. 
154 As a key expression of the object and purpose of a treaty: VCLT Article 31(1). 
155 Nagoya Protocol Article 5. 
156 Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck, cit. supra note 9, pp. 377-381. 
  
measures157 in pursuing both bilateral and global benefits for the purposes of both 
commutative and distributive justice. 
 
The clearest example of the interpretative function of the objective of fairly and 
equitably sharing benefits, however, concerns indigenous and local communities as 
beneficiaries under the Protocol. The qualified language surrounding communities' 
"prior informed consent or approval and involvement" vis-a-vis the genetic resources 
held by them and their traditional knowledge, and the reference to their "established 
rights" over such genetic resources are to be interpreted in light of the fair and 
equitable benefit-sharing objective of the Protocol and its bearing on mutual 
supportiveness with applicable international human rights law. This will serve to 
enlarge the scope of benefits to be shared with communities in fairness to their 
internationally recognised property or cultural rights over traditional land and natural 
resources.158 This reading is confirmed by the preambular reference in the Protocol to 
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,159 and to the affirmation that 
nothing in the Protocol will be constructed as diminishing or extinguishing the 
existing rights of indigenous and local communities. In this case, benefit-sharing as 
equity infra legem may contribute to commutative and distributive justice, as well as 
to justice as recognition. In addition, to the extent to which fair and equitable benefit-
sharing under the Nagoya Protocol influences the interpretation of the provisions 
related to the prior informed consent of local (as opposed to indigenous) 
communities, beyond the unclear recognition of these communities under 
international human right law, 160  it makes an original contribution to justice as 
recognition by progressively developing international law at the intersection of human 
rights and biodiversity.161 
 
More difficult, however, is to understand whether the interpretative function of 
benefit-sharing can cater to procedural justice, as the Protocol fundamentally leaves 
the details of the negotiations for the identification of benefits and modalities of 
sharing them to private, contractual negotiations (MAT). In the words of Francioni, 
 
This solution ... leaves uncertain whether equity is to be understood as infra legem, ie operating 
in the context of applicable principles and rules of international law, including the rules on the 
treatment of aliens and the rules governing the status of international public goods, or outside 
the law as an autonomous and unstructured source of principles which are assumed to inspire 
contractual arrangements.162 
 
                                                        
157 Klager, cit. supra note 116, p. 237. 
158 Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck, cit. supra note 9, pp. 122-126. 
159 Nagoya Protocol preambular paragraph 26; United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, UN General Assembly Res.  61/295 (13 September 2007). 
160 It has been convincingly argued that international human rights law does not yet clearly recognise 
local communities as right holders (Bessa, Traditional Local Communities in International Law, PhD 
thesis European University Institute, Florence, 2013), although there appear to be no principled reasons 
for international human rights not to evolve in that direction: De Schutter, "The Emerging Human 
Right to Land",  International Community Law Review, 2010, Vol. 12, p. 303 and ff., pp. 319, 324-325 
and 382-384. 
 
162 Francioni, cit. supra note 143, para. 28. 
  
In effect, not only does the Nagoya Protocol omit any substantive criteria to ensure 
that the establishment of equitable MAT,163 but on the procedural side, it does not 
provide any explicit mechanism to ensure fair negotiations of MAT.164 Nonetheless, it 
could be argued that interpreting States' obligations under the Nagoya Protocol in 
light of the objective of fairly and equitably sharing benefits would imply an active 
role of State Parties' governments in ensuring procedural justice also at the stage of 
private contractual negotiations through control and monitoring of private parties as 
part of States' due diligence under international law,165 particularly when international 
human rights law is relevant and applicable. The Protocol seems to explicitly point to 
less interventionist approaches in this regard, limited to encouragement to private 
parties,166 which can imply the creation of specific incentives to that end, or at the 
very least the removal of obstacles or disincentives, including in other related areas of 
national law.167 Nothing in the Protocol, however, prevents Parties from taking bolder 
approaches in ensuring procedural justice at the point at which MAT are established, 
and supportive arguments based on equity within the law and procedural justice could 
provide a strong basis to that end. 
 
3.2 Benefit-sharing as equity praeter legem 
 
With regards to equity beyond the law, the provision of the Nagoya Protocol that 
foresee benefit-sharing as a global mechanism appears to operationalize equity in its 
gap-filling function. In effect, Article 10 of the Protocol calls upon Parties to 
determine whether a gap exists in international law with regard to situations in which 
the utilization of genetic resources occurs in transboundary situations or in situations 
in which it is not possible to obtain or grant prior informed consent. Should Parties 
arrive to that conclusion, a global benefit-sharing mechanism is to be established to 
fill such a gap for the purposes of pursuing equity to the benefit of the conservation 
and sustainable use of biodiversity globally.168 Among the outstanding questions that 
Parties to the Nagoya Protocol are considering with a view to determining a possible 
gap, the question of whether the Protocol should serve to share benefits from the use 
of genetic resources in ex situ collections is on the table. There is, therefore a 
possibility in that connection to address certain questions related to the temporal 
scope of the Protocol and possibly for corrective justice to be realized to some extent.  
 
In addition, the outstanding questions Protocol Parties are considering under Article 
10 also include that of marine genetic resources in areas beyond natural 
                                                        
163 Nagoya Protocol Article 5(1-2 and 5) and 10th preambular recital. See Tvedt, “Beyond Nagoya: 
Towards a Legally Functional System of Access and Benefit-Sharing” in Oberthür and Rosendal, cit. 
supra note 103, p. 158 and ff. 
164 Morgera, Tsioumani and Buck, cit. supra note 9, p. 376. 
165 Ibid, pp. 131-132, 167-169 and 283-292. 
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conservation and sustainable use: ibid, pp. 192-196. 
167 A series of domestic laws will likely affect the effective functioning of domestic ABS frameworks, 
such as general environmental law, social-welfare law, property law, administrative law, commercial 
law, contract law, etc: Young, “An International Cooperation Perspective on the Implementation of the 
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jurisdictions.169 A gap in this regard, with notable distributive justice connotations, is 
concurrently under discussion in the framework of the UN General Assembly, which 
has recently launched formal negotiation of a new international legally binding 
treaty.170 This development begs the question: can benefit-sharing, as framed under 
the Nagoya Protocol, serve as equity praeter legem outside the framework of the 
Protocol? In other words, could some of the provisions on fair and equitable benefit-
sharing of the Nagoya Protocol fill gaps in the international law of the sea, in the 
context of the development of a new implementing agreement to the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea? An answer in the positive seems to be the opinion of several 
States involved in relevant discussions under the General Assembly.171 In addition, 
the text of the Nagoya Protocol itself, in regard to relationships with future, 
specialised ABS agreements, seems to point to the same conclusion. 172  In that 
connection, it can be argued that the Protocol subjects its Parties to an obligation to 
negotiate future, specialized ABS instruments in a manner that proactively supports 
the realization of fair and equitable benefit-sharing in accordance with the objective 
of the Protocol.173 
 
3.3 Benefit-sharing as equity contra legem 
 
Speaking of equity against the law may be quite far-fetched. From the viewpoint of 
systematic integration, this interpretative technique should not be used to modify an 
existing treaty,174 but to modify its application,175 although the distinction is easier to 
draw in the abstract that in practice. With regard to international law-making, instead, 
States can conclude a treaty for the purpose of producing effects not in accordance 
with the law that was previously binding upon them, as long as the international rules 
that are deviated from are not those to which no derogation is admitted or are owed to 
third Parties.176 But in this case too matters are complicated if one considers that 
several international law-making processes may be underway simultaneously in 
different fora, in the context of different international regimes, the outcome of which 
could have an impact on the relations between different areas of international law. 
 
In either case, the question as to whether benefit-sharing as framed in the Nagoya 
Protocol could also operationalize equity contra legem is a very difficult one, which 
currently can only be answered in a speculative manner. Nevertheless, it will be 
attempted here to engage with this function in order to return to the questions of 
contextual justice identified in the previous section, notably in the context of the 
                                                        
169 Intergovernmental Committee for the Nagoya Protocol, Recommendation 2/3 The need for and 
modalities of a global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism (Article 10). 
170 Morgera, " Benefit-Sharing in marine areas beyond national jurisdiction: where are we at? Part I-II-
III" BENELEX blog posts available at http://www.benelexblog.law.ed.ac.uk; and Scovazzi, 
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172 Nagoya Protocol Article 4(2). 
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174 Simma, cit. supra note 140, p. 584. 
175 Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim's International Law, 9th ed, London, 1992, p. 40 cited by 
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relationship between the Protocol and other international regimes, particularly outside 
the area of international environmental law. With regard to law-making, the fact that 
the Protocol shied away from offering a legal basis for derogating from international 
law on IPRs arguably suggests that using benefit-sharing as equity contra legem could 
have been theoretically possible, but States were not able to agree on it. It was argued 
during the negotiations that the question was being dealt under a more competent law-
making forum, namely the World Intellectual Property Organization.177 But as the fate 
of these (and other relevant178) negotiations remains quite uncertain at the time of 
writing, the foundations for enhanced mutual supportiveness between intellectual 
property rights and benefit-sharing could have been laid, at least for the interim, by 
the Nagoya Protocol. 
 
Another hypothetical avenue for benefit-sharing to operationalize equity contra legem 
could be the relation between the Protocol and international investment law. The latter 
could be invoked by a user that can claim to act as a foreign investor and allege a 
conflict between a provider country's ABS measures and the terms of an applicable 
bilateral investment treaty.179 As a matter of fact, the text of the Nagoya Protocol on 
relationships with existing international agreements180 seems to support equity infra 
legem rather contra legem in this case. Parties should avoid any principled approach 
in assessing and addressing the relationship of the Nagoya Protocol with other 
existing international agreements, focusing on a pragmatic, case-by-case approach to 
mutual supportiveness through interpretation based on systemic integration. 181 
Nonetheless, either in the case of IPRs or international investment law, it cannot be 
excluded that an international adjudicator in the future may rely on fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing, as developed in the Nagoya Protocol and interpreted in a mutually 
supportive fashion with relevant international human rights law, to derogate from 
difficulty reconcilable provisions in other international economic treaties.  
 
 
4. Preliminary findings and potential for further investigation 
 
While the preceding analysis has not attempted to offer a systematic engagement with 
the justice literature, it has shown the value to legal analysis of relating different 
notions of justice to different interpretations of existing international law and to 
different functions of equity pursued by it. Although this is hardly openly discussed in 
multilateral negotiations and rarely tackled in legal scholarship, the legal concept of 
fair and equitable benefit-sharing under the Nagoya Protocol is apt to combine 
different notions of justice, which in theory should feed into each other: recognition, 
commutative justice, distributive justice and procedural justice. Systematically 
unpacking these dimensions, explicitly discussing to what extent each can arguably be 
achieved under the specific provisions of the Protocol, and identifying other notions 
                                                        
177 Namely, the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore: WIPO General Assembly, “Matters concerning intellectual 
property and genetic resources, traditional knowledge and folklore” (3 October 2000) WIPO Doc 
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178 See supra note 92. 
179 Viñuales, Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law, Cambridge, 2012, p. 205.  
180 Nagoya Protocol Article 4(1). 
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of justice (such as contextual justice) that have not been pursued through international 
law-making appear as indispensible steps to critically assess the evolution of the legal 
concept of fair and equitable benefit-sharing from a justice perspective. A further step 
is then required: revisiting the traditional debate on the functions of equity in 
international law focusing on the continuous sub-specialization of different 
international regimes, with a view to critically assessing whether different notions of 
justice imbue international law-making and contribute to ensuring unity across 
different international sub-systems.   
 
This exercise may lay the foundations for a productive dialogue between international 
lawyers and other scholars and practitioners concerned with justice in conservation 
and environmental management more broadly. It serves to systematically unveil 
existing opportunities in international law that could contribute to achieving justice 
through equitable principles, which can be employed in negotiating concrete 
understandings of justice on a case-by-case basis. It further assists in revealing 
implicit legal design choices that limit the types of justice pursued in international 
law-making. As the above analysis shows, concrete opportunities for an interpretation 
of the Nagoya Protocol inspired by a pluralistic notion of environmental justice exist - 
which may appear quite a provocative finding when seen in the light of the criticisms 
concerning the limitations of the Protocol182 and of the negotiating dynamics that led 
to its adoption.183 
 
And there seems to be much scope to test this approach in other areas of international 
law where fair and equitable benefit-sharing has been increasingly referred to, as in 
the case of the international law of the sea, which was alluded to briefly above.184 
Another example may be in order to further substantiate this claim. In the context of 
the human rights of indigenous peoples,185 benefit-sharing has been referred to as a 
safeguard. At first glance, this may appear a reductionist reading of it: benefit-sharing 
is seen as subsidiary to the protection and realization of international rights, instead of 
an objective or a right of its own, and possibly also limited to a procedural function. 
By linking different notions of justice to different functions of equity, however, it is 
possible to engage in a more nuanced analysis. Benefit-sharing as a safeguard has 
been used to fill gaps (as equity preater legem) in one international human rights 
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regime with reference to another international human rights regime 186  and 
international biodiversity law,187 with a view to contributing not only to procedural 
but also to distributive justice and recognition. In the case of the Inter-American 
Convention on Human Rights, for instance, benefit-sharing has been referred to, in 
order to strengthen the protection of the rights of the Saramaka people over their 
natural resources against development projects, with a view to rewarding 
communities' role as ecosystem stewards, thereby recognizing at the same time their 
own inextricable relation with their territories and their contribution to global efforts 
to conserve and use sustainably biodiversity. And the same reasoning has been 
subsequently relied upon by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights 
to fill a gap in the African human rights regime with regard to the recognition and 
protection of the rights of the Endorois people against conservation measures that 
appeared unjust in terms of distribution, recognition and procedure.188  
 
This of course merely represents a point of departure for deeper analysis, but has the 
merit of directing attention to the relative weight of and tensions among the different 
notions of justice that may be pursued simultaneously by fair and equitable benefit-
sharing in the context of the cross-fertilization between international biodiversity law 
and human rights law. 189  It may help international legal scholars reflect more 
critically and systematically on the limitations of international law in pursuing justice, 
and help justice scholars and practitioners to identify existing opportunities in 
international law, that rely on mutual supportiveness among specific instruments on 
benefit-sharing, other areas of international law and general international law. 
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